11 August, 2020 | Dmitry Navosha, Forbes
The outrageous presidential election campaign and subsequent brutal dispersion of mass-protests may well be part of Aleksandr Lukashenko’s original plans. The consequences, however, for the incumbent leader of Belarus, and the country’s elites, may turn out to be catastrophic yet.
It has only become apparent now why Lukashenko paid visits both to military bases, and Special Forces units, during his election campaign – instead of visiting the towns and cities where his unexpected opponent Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, wife to a political prisoner, managed to attract record rallies across Belarus, from Vitebsk to Brest, Minsk and across the regional centers.
Winning the election was never Lukashenko’s goal. He has nothing, far too great is his disapproval rating. For a long time now, popular dissatisfaction, bordering on hatred, has been too great for him to truly “come out to the real people”, save for staged appearances in front of bussed-in and vetted crowds, as was the case for the announcement of his 80-percent triumph. In any case, Belarus has not seen a real election since 1994.
Lukashenko was going to win the war, and was preparing for one. Forceful suppression has always been sufficient to make people sad and depressed. The ever-loyal CEC (Central Election Committee) is always on stand-by to organize brilliant electoral victories by drawing Turkmeni numbers without even looking into ballot boxes. We are yet to see the full scale of the situation, as more information becomes available after the Internet blockade has been lifted, and more data is released by the platform Golos (“The Voice”, where over a million voters uploaded photos of their voting ballots.) Yet, the sheer effrontery of this lie is so overwhelming that the term “falsification” appears too formal and weak.
It is very difficult to control over 5000 RECs (Regional Election Committees), even when none of the independent observers have been granted entry. Old, previously loyal members of electoral commissions, decided to run an honest count, in spite of the de-facto cancellation of observation rights; or, at the very least, to falsify less. In some Minsk districts, Lukashenko hardly managed to exceed the proverbial 3%, falling short of his rival Tsikhanouskaya by a factor of 18.
Belarus does not just ban non-government sanctioned sociology; exit polls are also prohibited. However, exit polls were conducted outside Belarusian embassies in 17 countries.
The weighted average of Lukashenko’s share of the vote constituted 4%, as opposed to Tsikhanouskaya’s 87%. In Moscow, at the Belarusian embassy’s polling station, exit polls gave Lukashenko 6% and Tsikhanouskaya 79%. The polling station’s eventual protocol proclaimed victory for the President – 51%. Of course – thousands of Belarusians from the Moscow diaspora waited in queues for some 4-5 hours to re-elect him for the sixth term. TV reporters walked up and down this line of people to find a supporter of Lukashenko’s – alas, they did not seem to find one.
This would have been a classic landslide election, if Belarus had elections, but nothing of the kind transpired. Legally speaking, power currently rests with the State Committee of the State of Emergency. This armed group, a military dictatorship with no popular support, managed to incarcerate over 1500 people even before the election had taken place, including presidential candidates.
Let us get back to the figures of the 34 “rebel” RECs; Not only do they speak of the complete, deafeningly resounding victory of Tsikhanouskaya in polling stations that carried out a real vote count, but also of the preparedness of some committee members to act “as one must”, as opposed to “as one had been told to”. This is a direct statement of the changes affecting all layers of Belarusian society.
This note begins with the premise that Lukashenko was preparing for a war, not an election. He had announced it a number of times. On Monday, August 10th, night he unleashed it onto the streets of Minsk. Protests spread across over 30 towns and cities all over Belarus. Notably, everything went by peacefully in locations where Special Forces chose not to attack protesters. In Minsk however, a poster butchery was planned and executed. Rubber bullets were shot at peaceful and unarmed citizens. At close range, such bullets are no different to live ammunition. Civilians were rammed with military vehicles and water-cannons charged against them. Forces used both stun grenades and grenades with rubber shrapnel. There have been brutal beatings of defenceless people by special forces. A number of people are reported to be in intensive care, with one fatality officially confirmed.
Lukashenko understood perfectly well that the people, outraged by deceit, would take to the streets. Against them, he employed his favourite, best and well-prepared special forces and equipment. He gave the order to carry out an example in violence. This is considering that over nearly three months of protests in Belarus, not a single car had been set ablaze, nor a shop-window broken. Belarusian protesters gained fame when they, despite streets having been closed to traffic during rallies, stopped at red lights. The disproportionate and barbaric use of force by law enforcement has provoked a backlash from protesters, and still: such a deliberate use of special forces, so-called as they are reserved for special situations, clearly points to the goal.
To immobilize, to weaken, to shock. The goal may not have been to kill people, but to kill hope – absolutely. Lukashenko addresses society ever more rarely and less convincingly. He does not understand it, but this society has outgrown its ruler long ago. To defend his right to rule the country a further 5 years, Lukashenko had to make a strong statement. Translated from the language of blasts and gunshots, it reads as follows: “Don’t even try to change anything. Go back to your normal apathy and fear. I won’t give the country back to you, whatever the cost.”
Lukashenko also made a successful step in marking up his accomplices in blood. He handcuffed his Special Forces personnel to himself.
Did he scare the society? Certainly.
Did he manage to make the society bear him for another five years? Certainly not.
There is no legitimate authority in Belarus, and as a corollary, the consequences of this catastrophic campaign for Lukashenko continue to emerge. All stakeholders in this process will feel them, from civil society, to the Special Forces, and Lukashenko himself. This is the understanding they should all work with.
